首页> 外文会议>AIChE spring meeting;Global congress on process safety >How to Efficiently Perform the Hazard Evaluation (PHA) Required for Non-Routine Modes of Operation (Startup, Shutdown, Online Maintenance)
【24h】

How to Efficiently Perform the Hazard Evaluation (PHA) Required for Non-Routine Modes of Operation (Startup, Shutdown, Online Maintenance)

机译:如何有效执行非常规操作模式(启动,关闭,在线维护)所需的危害评估(PHA)

获取原文

摘要

Process safety is about controlling risk of failures and errors; controlling risk isprimarily about reducing human error. All elements of Risk-Based ProcessSafety (RBPS) and alternative standards for process safety (such as USOSHA’s standard for Process Safety Management [PSM] or ACC’s ProcessSafety Code? [PSC]) have many elements, and each of these in turn help toreduce the chance of human error or else limit its impact. One core element isthe process hazard analysis (PHA), also called a hazard identification and riskassessment (HIRA). PHAs have been performed formally in graduallyimproving fashion for more than five decades. Methods such as HAZOP andWhat-If Analysis have been developed and honed during this time. But, oneweakness identified twenty years ago still exists in the majority of PHAsperformed around the world; most PHAs do not thoroughly analyze the errorsthat can occur during startup mode, shutdown modes, and other non-routine(non-normal) modes of operations. This is despite the fact that most majoraccidents occur during non-routine operations (about 70%), even though theprocess/plant may only be in that mode of operation for 5% or less a year.Instead of focusing on the most hazardous modes of operation, most PHAsfocus on normal operations. In a majority of both older operations and newplants/projects, the non-routine modes of operations are not analyzed at all.This means that perhaps 60 to 80% of the accident scenarios during nonroutineoperations are being missed by the PHAs. If the hazard evaluationdoes not find the scenarios that can likely occur during these non-routineoperations, the organization will not know what safeguards are neededagainst these scenarios.This paper shows practical ways to efficiently and thoroughly analyze the stepby-step procedures that are used to control non-routine operating modes, aswell as those for batch and between batch operations. This paper builds uponthe methods and rules provided in papers beginning in 1993 and brings themup-to-date. Experienced PHA leaders should be able to use the rules andapproaches provided in this paper to improve their PHAs. And others will beable to use the results of this paper to estimate the number of accidentscenarios they may be missing and to estimate the time it would take tocomplete an efficient and thorough PHA of the non-routine modes ofoperation.
机译:流程安全与控制故障和错误的风险有关;控制风险是 主要是关于减少人为错误。基于风险的流程的所有要素 安全性(RBPS)和过程安全性替代标准(例如美国) OSHA的流程安全管理[PSM]或ACC流程标准 安全守则? [PSC])包含许多要素,而每个要素又有助于 减少人为错误的机会或限制其影响。一个核心要素是 过程危害分析(PHA),也称为危害识别和风险 评估(HIRA)。 PHA已逐步正式进行 改善时尚超过五十年。 HAZOP和 在此期间已开发并完善了假设分析。但是,一个 大多数PHAs仍然存在20年前发现的弱点 在世界各地演出;大多数PHA不能彻底分析错误 在启动模式,关闭模式和其他非常规过程中可能会发生 (非正常)操作模式。尽管事实是,最主要的 即使 流程/工厂每年只能在这种操作模式下运行5%或更少。 大多数PHA都没有专注于最危险的操作模式, 专注于正常运作。在大多数旧业务和新业务中 在工厂/项目中,根本不会分析非常规操作模式。 这意味着在非常规情况下可能发生60%至80%的事故 PHA错过了操作。如果危害评估 找不到这些非常规过程中可能发生的情况 操作,组织将不知道需要什么保护措施 针对这些情况。本文展示了有效,彻底地分析分步实施的实用方法- 用于控制非常规操作模式的步骤过程,例如 以及用于批处理和批处理之间的操作。本文建立在 从1993年开始的论文中提供的方法和规则,并将其引入 最新。经验丰富的PHA领导者应该能够使用规则和 本文提供的改善其PHA的方法。其他人会 能够使用本文的结果来估计事故数量 他们可能会丢失的情况,并估计所需的时间 完成非常规模式的高效彻底的PHA 手术。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号