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Coordinated Contract in Reverse Supply Chain with Collection Volume Agreement

机译:具有回收量协议的逆向供应链中的协调合同

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Aiming at the reverse bullwhip effect in reverse supply chain (RSC), a non-cooperative stackelberg model is set up with agreed collection volume. The centralized, decentralized and coordinated systems are brought out successively and the operation mechanism is analyzed afterwards. With the developed expense-sharing contract as the object of the study, the fact is proved that the RSC with collection volume agreement is more efficient. The numerical analysis is provided lastly. Such a contract not only extracts the maximal profit of the RSC, but can also improve the profit of each RSC member by tuning the contract parameters.
机译:针对逆向供应链(RSC)中的逆向牛鞭效应,建立了具有商定收集量的非合作式Stackelberg模型。提出了集中,分散,协调的系统,并对运行机制进行了分析。以制定的费用分摊合同为研究对象,事实证明,具有收款协议的RSC更为有效。最后提供了数值分析。这样的合同不仅可以提取RSC的最大利润,而且可以通过调整合同参数来提高每个RSC成员的利润。

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