On evolutionary game theory-based analysis and operation mode of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs

摘要

Because of the features of small size and lack funds of small and medium-sized enterprise (Abbr. SMEs) in our country, it has seriously effect on the safety situation of our country, and their own healthy growth. The evolutionary game theory-based modeling and stability analysis of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs is studied, and the operation mode of subsidy policy on safety investment is introduced. It indicates that the safety subsidy of local governments can enhance SMEs' enthusiasm to invest. In the operation process of subsidy policy in SMEs, the key factor is that the SMEs in time pay enough injury insurance, and the subsidized enterprises to invest matched funds to control safety risk. For relevant departments of local governments, supervision and law execution should be enhanced to ensure the operation effect. It has excellent significance to study further how to achieve equilibrium between SMEs and local governments using evolutionary game theory, and to provide theoretical basis to study operation mode of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs.