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Game Analysis on Banking Risk Supervision under Asymmetric Information

机译:信息不对称下银行风险监管的博弈分析

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Banks have boosted growth at the country level, at the industry level, and at the firm level. The positive effect of banks on economic development is robust to different econometric methods. Harmonized development of national economy is based on financial stability. Each side of supervision will chose its strategy according to the other side of the game to make the revenue maximized. In this paper, we analyze risk taking by banks, the strategy of banking supervisory. And bank under asymmetric information is anglicized based on game theory, and game model is established under the conditions of asymmetric information and is simulated in order to bring some new ideas for the banking risk supervision of China.
机译:银行促进了国家,行业和企业的增长。银行对经济发展的积极影响对于不同的计量经济学方法是有力的。国民经济的协调发展是建立在金融稳定基础上的。监管的每一方都将根据博弈的另一方来选择其策略,以使收入最大化。在本文中,我们分析了银行承担的风险,银行监管的策略。并基于博弈论对不对称信息下的银行进行了角度分析,并在不对称信息条件下建立了博弈模型并对其进行了仿真,以期为我国的银行风险监管带来新的思路。

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