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Coordination and Revenue Sharing Contract with the Newsvendor Problem

机译:与报童问题的协调和收益共享合同

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Supply chain coordination can be achieved by adopting the revenue sharing contract.Typically in this literature, market parameters such as demand distribution and selling price are exogenous.However, incorporating these factors, we can provide an excellent vehicle for how the revenue sharing contract interacts with the newsvendor problem to influence decision-making in the supply chain. This problem is similar to the classic revenue sharing contract-design problem, except: (a) demand distribution is selling price independent; (b) both the selling price and stocking level are decision variables. We consider two different ways in which selling price affects the demand distribution: the additive fashion and multiplicative fashion. We present methodology by which the optimization problem with two decision variables can be simplified to a maximization problem over a single variable. We explore conditions that may lead the revenue sharing contract with the newsvendor problem to achieve perfect channel coordination for the additive fashion and multiplicative fashion, respectively. The results indicate that the revenue sharing contract with the newsvendor problem cannot achieve perfect coordination.
机译:供应链的协调可以通过采用收益共享合同来实现。在典型的文献中,需求分配和销售价格等市场参数是外生的。但是,结合这些因素,我们可以为收益共享合同如何与之互动提供出色的工具。新闻供应商问题会影响供应链中的决策。该问题类似于经典的收益共享合同设计问题,不同之处在于:(a)需求分配与销售价格无关; (b)售价和库存水平都是决策变量。我们考虑销售价格影响需求分配的两种不同方式:加性方式和乘性方式。我们提出了一种方法,通过该方法可以将具有两个决策变量的优化问题简化为单个变量的最大化问题。我们探讨了可能导致与新闻供应商问题发生收益共享合同的条件,以分别实现加性和乘性方式的完美渠道协调。结果表明,具有新闻供应商问题的收益共享合同无法实现完美的协调。

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