首页> 外文会议>International conference on financial risk and corporate finance management >Government Intervention,Agency Costs and Efficiency of Merger and Acquisition Integration—an Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies
【24h】

Government Intervention,Agency Costs and Efficiency of Merger and Acquisition Integration—an Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies

机译:政府干预,机构成本与并购整合效率-基于中国上市公司的实证分析

获取原文

摘要

Existing literature is largely confined to merger and acquisition transaction efficiency,while has ignored merger and acquisition integration efficiencies,actually they are different in nature.This paper firstly distinguish merger and acquisition integration efficiencies and merger and acquisition transaction efficiency and analyze factors which influence merger and acquisition integration efficiencies,focus on impact of government intervention,agency cost on acquisition and integration efficiency.Empirical analysis shows: integration at different stages is with different emphasis and difficulties,major and minor must be distinguished in integration and implemented step by step; Agency costs of merger and acquisition activity greatly reduces acquisition and integration efficiency,but the performance forms of the Stateowned listed companies and private listed company vary depending on agency cost differences; Government intervention is always an important factor affecting the efficiency of merger and acquisition integration,and the government support or plunder State-owned listed companies for the sake of burden of policy or political goals: government intervention has negative impact on acquisition and integration of profitable state-owned listed company; positive impact on the loss-making State-owned enterprises; insignificant impact on the acquisition and integration of private enterprises.
机译:现有文献主要局限于并购交易效率,而忽略了并购整合效率,实际上本质上是不同的。本文首先对并购整合效率和并购交易效率进行了区分,分析了影响并购的因素。实证分析表明:不同阶段的整合具有不同的重点和难点,在整合中必须区分主要和次要,并逐步实施。并购活动的代理成本大大降低了并购效率,但国有上市公司和私人上市公司的业绩形式因代理成本差异而有所不同。政府干预始终是影响并购整合效率的重要因素,而政府出于政策或政治目标的负担而支持或掠夺国有上市公司:政府干预对盈利国家的并购和整合产生负面影响拥有的上市公司;对亏损的国有企业产生积极影响;对民营企业并购和整合的影响不大。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号