The threat of an insider with knowledge, access and authority remains one of the most pressing challenges to security within nuclear facilities. Insiders, witting or unwitting, working together or alone, possess the opportunity to enact grave damage to nuclear facilities through sabotage or unauthorized removal of nuclear material. However, the relative lack of insider case studies in the public domain makes identifying causal patterns and proposing effective protection/mitigation efforts difficult. To address this challenge, some scholars and practitioners interested in insider threat have leveraged lessons from other disciplines. Prominent contributions to insider threat literature have included case studies from high value jewelry heists and analyses of security measures within the casino and pharmaceutical industries. Despite the conceptual and practice similarities, the existing literature has thus far failed to assess the potential applications of counterintelligence theory for insider threat within nuclear facilities. Counterintelligence, defined by United States Executive Order 12333 as "information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations," provides a useful corollary to insider threat. Both programs seek to protect high-value targets from human vulnerabilities. Further, the high security atmosphere of the Intelligence Community more closely approximates the uniquely protected environment of a nuclear facility. This paper outlines how counterintelligence and nuclear insider threat will be compared, including the analytical rubric for evaluating program goals, perpetrator characteristics, and protection/mitigation efforts. This paper also introduces the fundamentals of contemporary U.S. counterintelligence practice, including background investigations, mandatory reporting requirements, and the use of counterintelligence indicators for investigative purposes. Using counterintelligence case studies from the past several decades in the United States, the paper explains how motivations and characteristics of prominent spies potentially applicable to insider threat analysis. Lastly, this paper will provide early insights from this comparative analysis, including discussing impacts for potentially improving insider threat programs at nuclear facilities across the globe.
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