Realistic Cover Traffic to Mitigate Website Fingerprinting Attacks

摘要

Website fingerprinting attacks have been shown to be able to predict the website visited even if the network connection is encrypted and anonymized. These attacks have achieved accuracies as high as 92%. Mitigations to these attacks are using cover/decoy network traffic to add noise, padding to ensure all the network packets are the same size, and introducing network delays to confuse an adversary. Although these mitigations have been shown to be effective, reducing the accuracy to 10%, the overhead is very high. The latency overhead is above 100% and the bandwidth overhead is at least 40%. We introduce a new realistic cover traffic algorithm, based on a user's previous network traffic, to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. In simulations, our algorithm reduces the accuracy of attacks to 14% with zero latency overhead and about 20% bandwidth overhead.