首页> 外文会议>IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control >A new two-stage game framework for power demand/response management in smart grids
【24h】

A new two-stage game framework for power demand/response management in smart grids

机译:用于智能电网中电力需求/响应管理的新的两阶段博弈框架

获取原文
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

Most existing cost optimization solutions ignore the long-term benefits for the customer, which may reduce the efficiency of the demand response management (DRM). In addition, without a power balance constraint, the power generation and consumption optimization problems are solved separately, which may cause a huge waste in power production. This paper presents a two-stage game framework to model and analyze such problems. In the first stage, a Stackelberg game framework for the generators and utility company is proposed to solve the cost optimization problem for power generation. A unique Nash equilibrium (NE) is obtained, in which the utility company obtains the optimized power outputs with the first-mover advantage. In the second stage, an infinite repeated game framework is proposed to the customers. A Pareto-efficient power consumption guideline is achieved for the customers, in which no customer gains more by reducing others' benefits. Our numerical results have shown that, with the same power consumption, the proposed two-stage framework can raise the profit for the utility company up to 8 percent while reduce the summation of the customers' costs up to 10 percent.
机译:大多数现有的成本优化解决方案都忽略了为客户带来的长期利益,这可能会降低需求响应管理(DRM)的效率。另外,在没有功率平衡约束的情况下,发电和功耗优化问题将分别解决,这可能会在电力生产中造成巨大的浪费。本文提出了一个两阶段的博弈框架来对此类问题进行建模和分析。在第一阶段,为发电商和公用事业公司提出了Stackelberg游戏框架,以解决发电成本优化问题。获得唯一的纳什均衡(NE),其中公用事业公司利用先行者优势获得优化的功率输出。在第二阶段,向客户提出了无限重复的游戏框架。为客户实现了帕累托高效的功耗指南,在该指南中,没有任何客户通过减少他人的利益而获得更多收益。我们的数值结果表明,在相同的功耗下,提出的两阶段框架可以将公用事业公司的利润提高多达8%,同时将客户成本的总和降低多达10%。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号