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Cryptanalysis of a Public Key Cryptosystem Based on Diophantine Equations via Weighted LLL Reduction

机译:基于丢番图方程的加权LLL约简对公钥密码系统的密码分析

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Okumura proposed a candidate of post-quantum cryptosystem based on Diophantine equations of degree increasing type (DEC). Sizes of public keys in DEC are small, e.g., 1,200 bits for 128 bit security, and it is a strongly desired property in post-quantum erea.In this paper, we propose a polynomial time attack against DEC. We show that the one-wayness of DEC is reduced to finding special (relatively) short vectors in some lattices. The usual LLL algorithm does not work well for finding the most important target vector in our attack. The most technical point of our method is to heuristically find a special norm called a weighted norm to find the most important target vector. We call this method "weighted LLL algorithm" in this paper. Our experimental results suggest that our attack can break the one-wayness of DEC for 128 bit security with sufficiently high probability.
机译:Okumura提出了一种基于度递增型Diophantine方程(DEC)的后量子密码系统的候选人。 DEC中公钥的大小很小,例如1,200位用于128位安全性,这是后量子区域中强烈希望的特性。本文提出了一种针对DEC的多项式时间攻击。我们表明,DEC的单向性被简化为在某些晶格中找到特殊的(相对)短向量。常见的LLL算法在寻找我们的攻击中最重要的目标向量时效果不佳。我们方法的最技术要点是启发式地找到一个称为加权范数的特殊范数,以找到最重要的目标向量。在本文中,我们将此方法称为“加权LLL算法”。我们的实验结果表明,针对128位安全性,我们的攻击可以以足够高的概率破坏DEC的单向性。

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