Practical Insights from the Uranium Sourcing Database Project to Inform the Establishment of a Nuclear Forensic Database Effort

摘要

International nuclear security relies heavily on maintaining regulatory control of nuclear and other radiological materials. When material is found outside of regulatory control, such as through an interdiction of illicit trafficking or discovery of a clandestine effort, the capability to determine the material's provenance can prove very valuable in identifying and correcting weaknesses in the nuclear security protocol, both nationally and internationally. Due to the complexity and variety of nuclear and other radiological materials, material provenance cannot be determined without reference to some knowledge base of material and process information. This is the basis for the National Nuclear Forensic Library (NNFL) concept, which may encompass not just information, but also a policy framework, a protocol for conducting queries, a network of domain experts, and a library of reference materials. There are various ways to implement a nuclear forensic knowledge base, ranging from a contact list of domain experts to a consolidated and comprehensive single database of all documented material data and metadata of importance for nuclear forensic investigations. In practice, each NNFL solution will be unique, and will likely land somewhere between these two extremes. Some may rely solely on existing databases, but others may identify a need for the creation of a new database, with nuclear forensic utility as a key (if not the only) design requirement. It is for this situation that we offer our insights based on years practical experience with a database designed to facilitate nuclear forensic investigations. The Uranium Sourcing Database is a working nuclear forensics database containing data on thousands of samples of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) and related products. The database is part of a broader effort to characterize and document distinguishing properties of UOC for use in assessing the probable source of a sample of material absent any packaging or identifying marks. While this effort has focused on UOC, the lessons learned are equally relevant to a wide range of nuclear and radiological materials. We will present a number of practical insights, including nuclear forensics database development and population, user interface requirements, analytical laboratory to database interface, and database utilization. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344 with the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Offices of Nuclear Verification (NA-243) and International Nuclear Forensic Cooperation (NA-213).