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The L_2/L_∞ Differential Game Guidance

机译:L_2 /L_∞差分博弈制导

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摘要

A differential game based minimax strategy, L_2=L_∞ guidance law, isderived for a missile with large lateral acceleration capability interceptingan evading target which has limited lateral acceleration capability.Planar motion, linearized kinematics, arbitrary-order linear adversaries’dynamics, and perfect information are assumed. The engagement isformulated as a two-person zero-sum pursuit-evasion game with a linearquadratic cost, where only the evader’s control is assumed bounded.Since the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution is not guaranteed, thesolution is derived via direct derivation of the game’s lower and uppervalues and the saddle point condition. It is shown that the existenceof a Nash equilibrium solution depends on the engagement’s initial conditions.Nonlinear simulations are performed for the case of a pursuerwith first order control dynamics and an evader with zero-lag dynamics,in order to illustrate the L_2=L_∞ guidance law’s implementation benefitsby comparison with classical optimal guidance laws.
机译:基于微分博弈的极小极大策略L_2 =L_∞制导律为 派生自具有大横向加速度拦截能力的导弹 具有有限的横向加速度能力的躲避目标。 平面运动,线性运动学,任意阶线性对手 动态性和完美的信息被假定。订婚是 公式化为线性的两人零和追逃游戏 二次成本,假设只有逃避者的控制是有界的。 由于不能保证存在纳什均衡解,因此 解决方案是通过直接推导游戏的上下限来得出的 值和鞍点条件。证明存在 纳什均衡解决方案的时间取决于参与活动的初始条件。 对于追击者,进行非线性仿真 具有一阶控制动力学和具有零滞后动力学的逃避器, 为了说明L_2 =L_∞指导法的实施收益 与经典的最佳制导律相比。

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