PPER: Privacy-preserving economic-robust spectrum auction in wireless networks

摘要

Many truthful spectrum auction schemes have been recently proposed to to ensure that the dominant strategy for bidders is to bid truthfully and thus protect the auctioneer's benefits. However, most of them assume the auctioneer is trustful and do not protect bidders' interests. An auctioneer can manipulate the winner's charging price if it knows bidders' bids. Thus, it is critical to protect bids from the auctioneer. Towards this end, we develop a Privacy-Preserving Economic-Robust spectrum auction scheme, namely PPER. Not only does it well protect users' bid privacy, but also guarantees economic-robustness which is another important auction property. Besides, only transmitters but not receivers are considered in most previous spectrum auctions, resulting in many unexpected collisions during transmissions. In this work, we consider interference constraints from transmissions instead of transmitters in spectrum allocation. Extensive privacy analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme.