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Towards Security of Internet Naming Infrastructure

机译:迈向Internet命名基础架构的安全性

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We study the operational characteristics of the server-side of the Internet's naming infrastructure. Our findings discover common architectures whereby name servers are 'hidden' behind server-side caching DNS resolvers. We explore the extent and the scope of the name servers that use server-side caching resolvers, and find such configurations in at least 38 % of the domains in a forward DNS tree, and higher per-cents of the domains in a reverse DNS tree. We characterise the operators of the server-side caching resolvers and provide motivations, explaining their prevalence. Our experimental evaluation indicates that the caching infrastructures are typically run by third parties, and that the services, provided by the third parties, often do not deploy best practices, resulting in misconfigurations, vulnerabilities and degraded performance of the DNS servers in popular domains.
机译:我们研究了Internet命名基础结构服务器端的操作特性。我们的发现发现了通用的体系结构,在这些体系结构中,名称服务器被“隐藏”在服务器端缓存DNS解析器的后面。我们探索使用服务器端缓存解析器的名称服务器的范围和范围,并在正向DNS树中的至少38%的域中找到此类配置,在反向DNS树中的更高百分比的域中找到这样的配置。我们对服务器端缓存解析器的操作员进行了描述,并提供了动机,并解释了它们的普遍性。我们的实验评估表明,缓存基础结构通常由第三方运行,并且由第三方提供的服务通常未部署最佳实践,从而导致在流行域中DNS服务器的配置错误,漏洞和性能下降。

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