In this paper I shall address an issue in philosophy of mind related to philosophy of mathematics, or more specifically to the nature of mathematical knowledge and reasoning. The issue concerns whether the human mind is fully algorithmic. I shall develop my answer against the background which is created by Kurt Godel's celebrated incompleteness theorems. In what follows: (ⅰ) I shall first sketch the main programs and responses to the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind; (ⅱ) then, I shall provide an informal overview of the two Godelian incompleteness theorems; (ⅲ) finally, I shall present and comment upon some of the main views advocated by Godel about minds and machines, mind and matter, and the contrast between Turing machines and the so-called Godel minds. In the process, Godel's very unorthodox and unfashionable views against computabilism, neuralism, physicalism, psychoneural parallelism, and even against the underlying philosophical presuppositions of the Turing machines will emerge. Shocking as they, understandably, are, as compared to the standard psychological and philosophical orthodoxy underlying the received computabilistic views on mind, Godel's own views are worth exploring and they fully deserve our undivided philosophical attention. Godel is, after all, the founding father and one of the essential inspiring sources for the whole domain and range of topics that I address in my paper.
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