首页> 外文会议>IEEE International Symposium on Service-Oriented System Engineering >Game Theoretic Analysis for Offense-Defense Challenges of Algorithm Contests on TopCoder
【24h】

Game Theoretic Analysis for Offense-Defense Challenges of Algorithm Contests on TopCoder

机译:TopCoder上算法竞赛的攻守挑战的博弈论分析

获取原文

摘要

Software crowd sourcing platforms such as TopCoder have successfully adopted the offense-defense based quality assurance mechanism into software development process to deliver high-quality software solutions. TopCoder algorithm contests run single-round matches (SRM) with the challenge phase that allows participants to find bugs in the submitted program and eliminate their opponents. In the paper, we introduce a game theoretic model to study the competitive behaviors in the challenge phase of SRM. By analyzing the Nash Equilibrium of our multiple-person game model, we find that the probability of making a successful challenge and effort cost are the major factors for contestants' decisions. To verify the theoretic result, we make empirical data analysis with the dataset collected from the algorithm challenge phase on TopCoder. And the results indicate that contestants with a high rating are more likely to launch challenges against lower ones. However, contestants with the highest rating may be unwilling to challenge to avoid risks of losing their points in the contests.
机译:诸如TopCoder之类的软件众包采购平台已成功地在软件开发过程中采用了基于防御的质量保证机制,以提供高质量的软件解决方案。 TopCoder算法竞赛在挑战阶段进行单轮比赛(SRM),允许参与者在提交的程序中发现错误并消除对手。在本文中,我们引入了一种博弈论模型来研究SRM挑战阶段的竞争行为。通过分析我们的多人博弈模型的纳什均衡,我们发现成功挑战的可能性和努力成本是参赛者决策的主要因素。为了验证理论结果,我们使用在TopCoder上从算法挑战阶段收集的数据集进行了经验数据分析。结果表明,评分较高的选手更有可能发起挑战,挑战较低的选手。但是,评分最高的参赛者可能不愿意挑战自己,以免失去在比赛中得分的风险。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号