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Game Theoretic Analysis for Offense-Defense Challenges of Algorithm Contests on TopCoder

机译:Topcoder算法临时防御挑战的游戏理论分析

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Software crowd sourcing platforms such as TopCoder have successfully adopted the offense-defense based quality assurance mechanism into software development process to deliver high-quality software solutions. TopCoder algorithm contests run single-round matches (SRM) with the challenge phase that allows participants to find bugs in the submitted program and eliminate their opponents. In the paper, we introduce a game theoretic model to study the competitive behaviors in the challenge phase of SRM. By analyzing the Nash Equilibrium of our multiple-person game model, we find that the probability of making a successful challenge and effort cost are the major factors for contestants' decisions. To verify the theoretic result, we make empirical data analysis with the dataset collected from the algorithm challenge phase on TopCoder. And the results indicate that contestants with a high rating are more likely to launch challenges against lower ones. However, contestants with the highest rating may be unwilling to challenge to avoid risks of losing their points in the contests.
机译:Topcoder等软件人群采购平台已成功采用基于防御防御的质量保证机制,进入软件开发过程,以提供高质量的软件解决方案。 Topcoder算法竞争使用挑战阶段运行单轮匹配(SRM),允许参与者在提交的程序中找到错误并消除他们的对手。在论文中,我们介绍了一个游戏理论模型,以研究SRM挑战阶段的竞争行为。通过分析我们多人游戏模型的纳什均衡,我们发现取得成功挑战和努力成本的可能性是参赛者决定的主要因素。为了验证理论结果,我们将实证数据分析与从TopCoder上的算法挑战阶段收集的数据集进行实证数据分析。结果表明,具有高评级的参赛者更有可能对较低的挑战发动挑战。然而,评级最高的参赛者可能不愿意挑战,以避免在比赛中失去积分的风险。

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