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A study for retailer's risk hedge considering responses of consumers in electricity deregulation

机译:针对零售商风险对冲的研究,其中考虑了消费者在电力管制放松中的反应

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Recently in Japan, a deregulation of electricity market is being extended and retailers are expected to supply the electricity to consumers. Moreover, an energy management system enables the consumers to easily manage their energy consumption according to the electricity prices. This means that a large number of decision makers who manages electricity energy will be in the electricity market. In order to operate stably the next generation power system, in which the structure of the system is complicated, it is necessary to appropriately design the market based on a detail market analysis with a mathematical model of the decision makers. Thus, to formulate a mathematical model that adequately represents the behavior of a large number of decision-makers in the power market is indispensable. From this background, we formulates a Stackelberg game model as the bilevel programming problem which represents the statistical decision making in a trade between the retailer and the consumers considering a forward contract and day-ahead market, real time trade. The computational experiment shows that the proposed decision making model can represents the behavior of the market players.
机译:最近在日本,放宽了对电力市场的管制,零售商有望向消费者提供电力。此外,能源管理系统使消费者能够根据电价轻松管理他们的能源消耗。这意味着大量管理电能的决策者将进入电力市场。为了使系统结构复杂的下一代电力系统稳定运行,有必要基于具有决策者数学模型的详细市场分析来适当地设计市场。因此,建立一个能够充分代表电力市场中众多决策者行为的数学模型是必不可少的。在这种背景下,我们将Stackelberg博弈模型表述为双层编程问题,该问题代表零售商和消费者之间考虑远期合约和日前市场,实时交易的交易中的统计决策。计算实验表明,所提出的决策模型可以代表市场参与者的行为。

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