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A study for retailer's risk hedge considering responses of consumers in electricity deregulation

机译:零售商风险对冲的研究考虑消费者在电力放松管制中的反应

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Recently in Japan, a deregulation of electricity market is being extended and retailers are expected to supply the electricity to consumers. Moreover, an energy management system enables the consumers to easily manage their energy consumption according to the electricity prices. This means that a large number of decision makers who manages electricity energy will be in the electricity market. In order to operate stably the next generation power system, in which the structure of the system is complicated, it is necessary to appropriately design the market based on a detail market analysis with a mathematical model of the decision makers. Thus, to formulate a mathematical model that adequately represents the behavior of a large number of decision-makers in the power market is indispensable. From this background, we formulates a Stackelberg game model as the bilevel programming problem which represents the statistical decision making in a trade between the retailer and the consumers considering a forward contract and day-ahead market, real time trade. The computational experiment shows that the proposed decision making model can represents the behavior of the market players.
机译:最近在日本,延长了电力市场的放松管制,预计零售商将向消费者提供电力。此外,能源管理系统使消费者能够根据电价轻松管理其能源消耗。这意味着增加电力能源的大量决策者将在电力市场中。为了稳定地操作下一代电力系统,其中系统的结构复杂,必须根据具有决策者的数学模型的详细市场分析来适当地设计市场。因此,为了制定充分代表大量决策者在电力市场中的行为是不可或缺的数学模型。从这个背景中,我们将Stackelberg游戏模型作为Bilevel编程问题,代表零售商与消费者之间的贸易统计决策,考虑前锋合同和日前市场,实时贸易。计算实验表明,建议的决策模型可以代表市场参与者的行为。

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