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Trading public transport travel demand for electronic coupons through mobile device fare collection

机译:通过收集移动设备的票价来交易公共交通对电子优惠券的需求

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Mobile technologies are generating new business models for urban transport systems, as isevident from recent startups cropping up from the private sector. Public transport systems canmake more use of mobile technologies than just for measuring system performance, improvingboarding times, or for analyzing travel patterns. Unlike earlier studies on mobility credits, a newtransaction model is proposed for public transport systems where travelers are allowed to prebooktheir fares and trade that demand information to private firms. In this public-privatepartnership model, fare revenue management is outsourced to third party private firms such asbig box retail or large planned events (such as sports stadiums and theme parks), who can issueelectronic coupons to travelers to subsidize their fares. This e-coupon pricing model is analyzedusing marginal cost theory and shown to be quite effective for monopolistic firm participation,particularly for demand responsive transit systems that feature high cost fares, non-commutetravel purposes, and a closed access system with existing pre-booking requirements. However,oligopolistic scenarios analyzed using game theory and network economics suggest that publictransport agencies need to take extreme care in planning and implementing such a policy.Otherwise, they risk pushing an equivalent tax on private firms or disrupting the urban economyand real estate values.
机译:移动技术正在为城市交通系统产生新的商业模式 最近的初创公司从私营部门涌现,这一点显而易见。公共交通系统可以 更多地使用移动技术,而不仅仅是测量系统性能,从而提高 登机时间,或用于分析出行方式。与先前有关流动性信用的研究不同,新的 对于允许旅客预售的公共交通系统,提出了交易模型 他们的票价和交易需要私人公司提供信息。在这个公私 伙伴关系模式,票价收入管理外包给第三方私人公司,例如 大型零售商或大型计划活动(例如体育馆和主题公园),可以发行 给旅客的电子优惠券,以补贴其票价。分析了此电子优惠券的定价模型 使用边际成本理论,并证明对垄断企业的参与非常有效, 特别是对于具有高票价,非通勤的需求响应型公交系统 旅行目的,以及具有现有预预订要求的封闭式出入系统。然而, 使用博弈论和网络经济学分析的寡头垄断情景表明,公众 运输机构在规划和实施此类政策时必须格外小心。 否则,他们冒着对私营公司征收同等税率或破坏城市经济的风险 和房地产价值。

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