Cryptographic methods are used to protect confidential information against unauthorised modification or disclo-sure. Cryptographic algorithms providing high assurance exist, e.g. AES. However, many open problems related to assuring security of a hardware implementation of a cryptographic algorithm remain. Security of a hardware implementation can be compromised by a random fault or a deliberate attack. The traditional testing methods are good at detecting random faults, but they do not provide adequate protection against malicious alterations of a circuit known as hardware Trojans. For example, a recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor demonstrated that the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) may fail even the simple case of stuck-at fault type of Trojans. In this paper, we present a novel LBIST method for Feedback Shift Register (FSR)-based cryptographic systems which can detect such Trojans. The specific properties of FSR-based cryptographic systems allow us to reach 100% single stuck-at fault coverage with a small set of deterministic tests. The test execution time of the proposed method is at least two orders of magnitude shorter than the one of the pseudo-random pattern-based LBIST. Our results enable an efficient protection of FSR-based cryptographic systems from random and malicious stuck-at faults.
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