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Bayes' Rule and Bank Credit Game Risk Analysis

机译:贝叶斯统治和银行信贷博弈风险分析

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摘要

The relationship between the small and medium-sized enterprise and bank in China, is different from that of complete market economy. Banks often cannot determine enterprise's real situation and make the right decision because of serious information asymmetry phenomenon in financing process. In the process of using the related theory of game theory to research credit financing problems between bank and enterprise, this paper tries to use Bayes' rule to help bank correctly judges the type of enterprise to avoid making mistakes loan determine.
机译:中小企业与中国银行之间的关系与完全市场经济的关系不同。 由于融资过程中的严重信息不对称现象,银行往往无法确定企业的真实情况并做出正确的决定。 在利用博弈论相关理论的过程中对银行与企业之间的信贷融资问题,本文试图利用贝叶斯规则来帮助银行正确判断企业的类型,以避免贷款确定。

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