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IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL APPROACH TO NON-PROLIFERATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

机译:联合国安全理事会方法对21世纪不扩散执行的影响

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The central principle of the international law of arms control is that there are no rules by which thelevel of armaments of states is limited except those to which the state itself consents. In the interest ofachieving the broadest possible adherence, multilateral arms control treaty regimes focused onweapons of mass destruction provide for a range of incentives to become and remain a State Party,such as codification of the right of peaceful development, while offering a way out in the form of awithdrawal clause. Both of these elements are found in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT). The conditions for withdrawal from the NPT require that extraordinary events havejeopardized the State’s supreme interests, though the text allows the state substantial discretion inmaking this determination. At the same time, in the event of non-compliance by a State Party, theinstitutional enforcement mechanisms available under the auspices of the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) are quite weak. Taking the role of enforcer, the Security Council has consistentlydeemed the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a threat to international peace and security, therebytriggering the UN collective security system and its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter –being able to take measures binding on all states. Actions taken under these powers since the turn ofthe century have included requiring states to enact certain domestic legislation (Resolution 1540),demanding North Korea’s return to the NPT (essentially overriding the consent element), anddeciding that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities. This paper expounds upon whether suchactions fall under the Security Council’s competences, whether such actions denote a shift towardallowing for extraordinary measures to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation, and what thebroader implications are for the further development of the non-proliferation regime.
机译:国际军备控制法的中心原则是,没有任何规则可以使 除了国家本身同意的军备以外,国家的军备水平是有限的。为了……的利益 为了实现尽可能广泛的遵守,多边军备控制条约制度侧重于 大规模毁灭性武器为成为和保持缔约国提供了一系列激励措施, 例如将和平发展权编成法律,同时以 退出条款。这两个要素都在《不扩散核武器条约》中找到。 武器(NPT)。退出《不扩散核武器条约》的条件要求发生特殊事件 尽管该案文允许该州实质性裁量权,但损害了该州的最高利益。 做出这个决定。同时,在缔约国不遵守的情况下, 在国际原子能的主持下可利用的体制执行机制 原子能机构(IAEA)非常薄弱。安全理事会一直充当执行者的角色 认为核武器的扩散对国际和平与安全构成威胁,因此 根据《联合国宪章》第七章触发联合国集体安全体系及其权力– 能够采取对所有州具有约束力的措施。自转战以来在这些权力下采取的行动 本世纪包括要求各州颁布某些国内立法(第1540号决议), 要求朝鲜重返《不扩散核武器条约》(本质上是凌驾于同意元素之上),以及 决定伊朗必须中止所有浓缩活动。本文阐述了是否这样 行动是否属于安全理事会的职权范围,无论这些行动是否表明朝着 允许采取特殊措施来应对核扩散的威胁,以及 更广泛的含义是防扩散制度的进一步发展。

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