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To or Not to Cooperate with Third-Party E-commerce Platform: The Influence of Commission Fee and Service Level

机译:与第三方电子商务平台合作:委员会费和服务水平的影响

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The third-party e-commerce platform is now widely adopted by small and medium sized retailers.For the retailer, commission fee and service level provided by the platform are two key factors influencing the pricing strategy and sales profit.However, these two factors are rarely considered in previous operations models.Taking both factors into consideration, we formulate the decision-making problem of third-party e-commerce as a Stackelberg game where the platform is the leader and the retailer is the follower.Given the platform's commission fee, we derive optimal sales price for the retailer and optimal service level for the platform.Our result shows that the platform's service level must be high enough to guarantee a positive profit and the effect of commission fee is dependent.Precisely, when the commission fee is small (or large) enough, the retailer and the platform can reach a consensus to increase (or to decrease) it.When it is moderate, they will bargain with each other, i.e., the retailer wants to decrease commission fee but the platform wants to increase it.Based on these observations, retailers are able to choose sales channel with more profit by comparing online store and offline shop.
机译:第三方电子商务平台现在被中小型零售商广泛采用。对于零售商,该平台提供的佣金费和服务水平是影响定价战略和销售利润的两个关键因素。然而,这两个因素是在以前的操作模型中很少考虑。考虑到这两个因素,我们制定了第三方电子商务的决策问题,作为一个Stackelberg游戏,平台是领导者,零售商是福尔威尔。这个平台的佣金费,我们推导出零售商的最佳销售价格以及平台的最佳服务水平。结果表明,平台的服务级别必须高,以保证竞争费用依赖的积极利润,委员会费用依赖。委员会费用很小(或大)足够,零售商和平台可以达成共识,增加(或减少)。当它适中时,他们将互相讨价还价,即零售商希望减少佣金费,但平台希望增加它。基于这些观察结果,通过比较在线商店和离线商店,零售商能够选择更多利润的销售渠道。

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