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Mechanism of agent evaluation based on infinite repeated game

机译:基于无限重复游戏的药剂评价机制

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In addition to China bid evaluation subject of the legal responsibilities and rights are not equal, the bid evaluation committee's temporary and project the long-term is contradictory. Therefore, when the tenderee was not satisfied with the evaluation results, it is difficult to recover and responsibility to their own interests. In view of the present evaluation mechanism based on the bid evaluation committee, there are not experts in the same level, it is difficult for experts to make a comprehensive evaluation of the tender documents in a limited time, and the evaluation effect is not obvious and so on. The article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Individual evaluation and agent evaluation, and then points out the discount factor on the tenderee and bid evaluation agent from the game, proves that the feasibility of bid evaluation agent, finally constructs the basic countermeasures of agent evaluation. It opens up a new perspective to further standardize the bidding market mechanism.
机译:除中国投标评估后的法律责任和权利不平等,竞标评估委员会的临时和项目长期矛盾。因此,当招标对评估结果不满意时,难以恢复和责任自己的利益。鉴于目前基于投标评估委员会的评估机制,没有专家在同一水平上,专家难以在有限的时间内全面评估招标文件,评价效果并不明显和很快。本文分析了个别评估和代理评估的优缺点,然后指出倾向和投标评估代理商的折扣因素,证明了出价评估剂的可行性,最终构建了代理评价的基本对策。它开辟了一个新的视角,以进一步标准化招标市场机制。

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