首页> 外文会议>INMM annual meeting >PHASED IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA VERIFICATION IN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO PROMOTE NONPROLIFERATION,ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES
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PHASED IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA VERIFICATION IN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO PROMOTE NONPROLIFERATION,ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES

机译:核武器国家对原子能机构核查的分阶段实施,以促进不扩散,军备控制和裁军目标

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Progress on nuclear arms control and policies that support disarmament in the long-term are U.S. obligations under theNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and top priorities of the Obama Administration. The Administration has taken action tonegotiate and implement various arms control treaties while expanding its support for international verification ofpeaceful uses under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards. This paper explores the potential benefitsand costs of a long-term phased approach to implementation of existing Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOA) to advanceU.S. and other Nuclear Weapon State’s (NWS) nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament goals. Under this newapproach to VOA implementation, all new enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) capacity constructed in the United Statesand partnering NWS would be placed under active IAEA Safeguards pursuant to existing VOAs. Furthermore, allclosed down and decommissioned ENR capacity would be subject to Complimentary Access (CA) status inspectionsunder related Additional Protocols (AP). In non-NPT States, comparable arrangements could be pursued throughexpanded INFCIRC/66 Safeguards implementation on a facility-by-facility basis. Placing all new ENR capacity underIAEA Safeguards is an essential first step down “the road to global zero” since the end point of that road requiresuniversal peaceful use verification. Along that road, an essential step is a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty(FMCT), or a logically equivalent set of multilateral or bilateral agreements. Phased VOA implementation as describedabove could gradually reduce the practical barrier to verification of an FMCT. By focusing on new ENR capacity andverifying status of closed down and decommissioned ENR facilities, a gradually rising on-ramp is built which supportsthe desired outcomes and a reasonable transition period for IAEA budgetary and technical preparations. This phasedapproach enables a sustainable and incremental path to move the United States, other NWS, and non-NPT States intopositions that supports verification of an FMCT and the road to global zero.
机译:长期支持核裁军的核军备控制政策和政策是美国根据《联合国宪章》承担的义务。 《不扩散条约》(NPT)和奥巴马政府的当务之急。政府已采取行动 谈判和执行各种军备控制条约,同时扩大其对国际核查的支持 国际原子能机构(IAEA)保障措施下的和平利用。本文探讨了潜在的好处 实施现有自愿要约协议(VOA)的长期分阶段方法的成本和成本 美国和其他核武器国家(NWS)的防扩散,军备控制和裁军目标。在这个新下 VOA实施的方法,在美国构建的所有新的浓缩和后处理(ENR)能力 根据现有的美国之音,将把与之建立伙伴关系的NWS置于有效的IAEA保障之下。此外,所有 关闭和退役的ENR容量将接受免费访问(CA)状态检查 根据相关的附加协议(AP)。在非《不扩散核武器条约》国家中,可以通过 扩大了INFCIRC / 66在各个设施基础上实施保障的范围。将所有新的ENR能力放置在 IAEA保障措施是“通向全球零之路”必不可少的第一步,因为这条道路的终点要求 普遍和平利用核查。沿着这条道路,至关重要的一步是可核查的《裂变材料禁产条约》 (FMCT)或一组逻辑上等效的多边或双边协议。如所述的分阶段VOA实施 以上可以逐步减少验证FMCT的实际障碍。通过专注于新的ENR能力和 验证已关闭和退役的ENR设施的状态,建立了逐渐上升的入口匝道,以支持 原子能机构预算和技术准备的预期成果和合理的过渡期。此阶段 这种方法使美国,其他新创建国家和非《不扩散核武器条约》国家进入 支持验证FMCT和通向全球零之路的职位。

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