PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL INDEX: MEASURING SAFEGUARDS COMPLIANCE VALUE

摘要

State-level nuclear proliferation is a complex technical, politico-military and socio-economic behavior beyond the reach of simple predictive models. Even so, it may be useful to develop a proliferation potential index (PPI) - a simplified aggregate scale of the complex problem so that State-level comparisons can be more easily followed and analyzed. Through a well-constructed metric, insights may be obtained regarding the relationships and possible tipping points given opposing influences that combine to enhance the potential for a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) to commence a nuclear weapon program. The PPI is defined as a normalized dimensionless index that varies between zero and one (minimal and maximal), indicating potential for emergence of a State-directed program to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons in a NNWS. The current working formulation of the PPI is the geometric mean of three principal influence indices representing the contributions of a State's related technical capability, the damping effect of the nonproliferation regime, and national motivators forcing nuclear armament policies. The concept under consideration is loosely synonymous with the traditional practice of developing constructed metrics that are used as tracking indices of complex market sector trading behavior (e.g., Dow Jones, S&P, Nasdaq, publish various market indices). The current paper briefly describes the overall formulation of the PPI and how a multi-attribute utility measurement (MAUM) approach, based on swing weighting, can be applied to construct a measure for sub-factors representing the influence of IAEA Safeguards regime compliance status.