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PROGRESSIVE DE-ALERTING ON THE PATH TO ZERO

机译:渐进式解除警报零的路径

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This article explores an approach to nuclear arms reductions that would make nuclear weapons increasingly less relevant in relations between the major powers. These nations would undertake a program of progressive increases in latency calibrated to degrade the readiness of their respective nuclear forces in essentially the same degree. The program would be an extrapolation of "taking weapons off alert," by augmenting the time required to deliver a weapon on target. If the implementing measures could be verified with high confidence, the participating nations could subscribe without compromising their relative strategic position. Nuclear deterrence balances, although less prominent, would remain intact. Under these conditions, the major powers would have much less tolerance for nuclear weapons proliferation than is the case today. Aspiring proliferators would be stopped one way or another by combined action of the most powerful states. With progressive reduction in the military value of nuclear forces, there would be commensurate reduction in the obstacles and dangers encountered in transition to a world with fewer or even "zero" nuclear weapons. "Global zero" would become an extreme condition of latency that is verified and enforced, with all nations participating either willingly or under vigilant coercion by the major powers.
机译:本文探讨了核武器减少的方法,使核武器在主要权力之间的关系中越来越越来越多。这些国家将采取延迟增加的渐变增加计划,以降低其各自的核力量的准备程度。该计划将是“采取武器关闭警报”的推断,通过增强在目标上提供武器所需的时间。如果可以以高信任验证实施措施,则参与国家可以在不影响其相对战略地位的情况下订阅。核威慑余额虽然突出,但仍然完整。在这些条件下,主要权力将对核武器扩散的耐受性远低于今天的核武器。通过组合最强大的国家的组合行动将抱负有吸引力的增殖者。随着核动力军事价值的逐步减少,将在向世界过渡时遇到的障碍和危险减少,较少甚至“零”核武器。 “全球零”将成为待遇和执行的延迟的极端条件,所有国家都会通过主要权力进行愿意或在警惕胁迫下参与。

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