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Evaluation of a Containment Failure Frequency Considering Mitigation Accident Managements for a Japanese PWR Plant

机译:考虑日本PWR植物的缓解事故管理遏制失败频率的评价

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Institute of Nuclear Safety of NUPEC is carrying out a program of developing methodology of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and severe accident analysis. For a Japanese 4-loop PWR plant with a pre-stressed concrete containment, containment failure frequency evaluation methods by point-estimate and uncertainty estimate were established for internal initiating events during full power operation assuming mitigation accident management. In the point-estimate evaluation, core damage sequences were categorized for every plant damage state (PDS) using the results of Level 1 PSA that evaluated core damage frequencies. Sequences both without and with mitigation AM countermeasures were analyzed with the MELCOR code: (1) the natural convection cooling by containment cooling units for normal operation, (2) fire water injection into the containment, (3) the forced depressurization of primary system by pressurizer PORVs, (4) the restoration of containment spray system, and (5) water injection into the primary system by charging pumps. A containment event tree including the AM measures was made, and the simplified reliability evaluation on equipment failure and human factor at AM operation was executed. Severe accident sequence representing each PDS was analyzed with MELCOR code in order to quantify the branch probability of a containment event tree. The quantification of containment event tree was done for each plant damage state. Consequently, in the case of AMs included, the total containment failure frequency was obtained to be 1.1×10~(-7) / reactor year comparing 2.2×10~(-7) / reactor year with without AMs. A dominant sequence of containment failure when the AM plan is implemented is an interface system LOCA sequence that a pipe of the residual heat removal system breaks loaded primary system pressure.
机译:NUPEC核安全研究所正在开展概率安全评估(PSA)和严重事故分析方法的开发方法。对于具有预应力混凝土壳的日本4环PWWR厂,在假设缓解事故管理期间,为内部启动事件建立了通过点估计和不确定性估计的遏制失效频率评估方法。在点估计评估中,使用评估核心损坏频率的级别1 PSA的结果,对每个植物损伤状态(PDS)分类核心损伤序列。用熔体代码分析了没有和缓解AM对策的序列:(1)通过遏制冷却装置进行正常操作的自然对流冷却,(2)将注水注射到遏制中,(3)初级系统的强制减压加压器Porvs,(4)通过充电泵恢复容纳喷雾系统,(5)注水进入主系统。在包括AM措施的一个容纳事件树上,执行了关于AM操作的设备故障和人为因素的简化可靠性评估。用熔体代码分析表示每个PD的严重事故序列,以量化容纳事件树的分支概率。为每个植物损伤状态进行遏制事件树的量化。因此,在包括AMS的情况下,可以获得总容纳失效频率为1.1×10〜(-7)/反应堆年,比较2.2×10〜(--7)/反应堆年份,没有AMS。当实施AM计划时,主导储能失效序列是一个接口系统LOCA序列,即残余散热系统的管道断开负载初级系统压力。

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