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Incentive Mechanism in Two-stage Service Supply Chains Based on the Revenue Sharing Contract

机译:基于收益共享契约的两阶段服务供应链激励机制

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When the service provider outsources some services to the supplier, the service supply chain will be formed. As the supplier offers services directly to the end customers, it is difficult to monitor the supplier's behavior by the service provider. Therefore an incentive mechanism to supplier will be quite significant in service supply chain. This paper studies the optimal incentive mechanism under the revenue sharing contract which is usually efficient in supply chain management. By setting up the incentive model, the research mainly discusses about the prior condition for the supplier to offer costly effort under the revenue sharing contract, the optimal incentive mechanism and the condition to validate incentive, etc. The result shows that: l)It is unnecessary to offer an incentive to the service supplier in all service supply chains. 2)The incentive mechanism is available just in the service supply chains which comply with certain demand distributions. 3)There is a discontinuous point on the incentive payment curve.
机译:当服务提供商将某些服务外包给供应商时,将形成服务供应链。由于供应商直接向最终客户提供服务,因此服务提供商很难监视供应商的行为。因此,对供应商的激励机制在服务供应链中将非常重要。本文研究了收益共享合同下的最优激励机制,该机制通常在供应链管理中是有效的。通过建立激励模型,本研究主要讨论了收益共享合同下供应商付出高昂代价的先决条件,最优激励机制和激励有效性条件等。结果表明:没有必要在所有服务供应链中激励服务提供者。 2)激励机制仅在符合某些需求分布的服务供应链中可用。 3)激励支付曲线上有一个不连续的点。

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