EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE ESTIMATION AND EFFECTIVE FACTORS OF PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES

摘要

As the research in the field of Corporate Governance deepens, the core issue in corporate governance has been shifted to the question that how to deal with the agent problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Private Benefits of Control is the key of this problem. How to estimate the amount of private benefits of control and protect minority shareholders has gradually become a centerpiece of the recent literature, both theoretically and empirically. Firstly, the paper analyzes the relation between private benefits of control and the level of corporate control premium and the intrinsic theoretical basis of Barclay & Holderness model, together with investigating the model’s applicability in China. According to the environment of Chinese stock market, we put forward an amended PBC model based on our capital market. Based on the empirical results, this dissertation puts forward some policy suggestions to strengthen the law protection of small and medium investors; these suggestions including gradually solving stock separations problem, perfecting the supervision mechanism, making agents and institution on independent directors more formal.