Manipulation Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay Level: Evidence from Listed Firms of China

摘要

Following the managerial discretion approach, the paper empirically analyzes the manipulation effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay level of China's Listed Firms. Descriptive statistics and multivariate linear regression model are used here.Both theoretical analysis and empirical tests show that: (1) Managerial discretion has positive effect on CEO pay level; (2) Compared with weak-monitored firms, managerial discretion has Weaker positive effect on CEO pay level for CEOs in strong-monitored firms;(3) Compared with firms with lower performance, there is stronger relationship with Firm performance and managerial pap level for CEOs in firms with higher performance. Based on the three results, the paper makes conclusion that CEOs in China's Listed firms really can influence the setting of CEO pay level by misusing managerial discretion, and the manipulation effect actually exists.