The work presented here describes a new method to incorporate material control and accountability(MC&A)protection elements within the existing probabilistic vulnerability assessment(VA)methodology to estimate the probability of effectiveness(P_E)for insider threats.MC&A activities,from monitoring to inventory measurements,provide information about target materials and define security elements useful against insider threats.Activities that discourage insiders provide many,often reoccurring opportunities to determine the status of critical items.Considering this,we have developed an object-based state machine paradigm whereby an insider theft scenario races against MC&A activities that can move a facility from a normal state to a heightened alert state having additional detection opportunities.This paradigm has been coupled with nuclear plant probabilistic risk assessment(PRA)methods to incorporate the evaluation of MC&A elements in the existing VA methodology.Along with the PE for the physical protection system(PPS),the overall result is an integrated effectiveness measure of a protection system that addresses outsider and insider threats.
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