首页> 外文会议>Bulding Core Competencies Through IEEM >Principal-Agent Model Analysis for Supply Chains Cooperative Relation in the Open Condition
【24h】

Principal-Agent Model Analysis for Supply Chains Cooperative Relation in the Open Condition

机译:开放条件下供应链合作关系的委托-代理模型分析

获取原文

摘要

Some papers analyzed the supply chains cooperative relation used the repeated game model or reputation effect model. Along with the communication technology advance and the global economy integration in the 1990's, supply chains cooperative relation between different regions is facing with the more seriously asymmetric information problem. Besides developing the information communicated technology and demand forecasting technology about operation flows, it need resolve the trust problem in the course of information communication. In the practical economy, some relation network such as Haier Group develops the punish mechanism banished the cheat in this colony. The paper analyzes this phenomenon used the repeated game theory, and gets the incentive compatibility constraint that the agent need content, the different strategies design for the consigner. In the last, the paper gets some important conclusions and analyzes them practical meaning.
机译:一些论文使用重复博弈模型或声誉效应模型分析了供应链合作关系。随着通信技术的进步和1990年代的全球经济一体化,不同地区之间的供应链合作关系正面临着更为严重的信息不对称问题。除了开发有关操作流程的信息通信技术和需求预测技术外,还需要解决信息通信过程中的信任问题。在实际经济中,海尔集团等关系网络发展了惩罚机制,以消除该群体的欺诈行为。本文运用重复博弈理论对这一现象进行了分析,得到了代理人需要满足的激励相容约束,为发货人设计了不同的策略。最后,本文得出了一些重要的结论,并对它们的现实意义进行了分析。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号