Potential Impact Of Atmospheric Releases At Russian Far East Nuclear SubmarineComplexes

摘要

An "Assessment of the Impact of Russian Nuclear Fleet Operations on Far Eastern CoastalRegions" is being performed as part of the Radiation Safety of the Biosphere Project (RAD) ofthe International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) of Laxenburg, Austria. To thebest of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive unclassified analysis of the potentialimpact of accidents at the Russian Far East nuclear submarine sites near Vladivostok andPetropavlovsk. We have defined the situation there based upon available information and studiescommissioned by RAD in collaboration with Russian research institutes including RussianResearch Center-"Kurchatov Institute", Institute of Northern Environmental Problems andLazurit Central Design Bureau. Further, in our original work, some in collaboration with the staffof the Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI) and members of the Japan Atomic EnergyResearch Institute, we have calculated the nuclide trajectories from these sites in the atmosphericboundary layer, less than 1.5 kilometers high, and determined their probability of crossing any ofthe nearby countries as well as Asiatic Russia. We have further determined the concentrations ineach of these crossings as well as the total, dry and wet depositions of nuclides on these areas.Finally, we have calculated the doses to the Japanese Island population from typical winterairflow patterns (those most likely to cross the Islands in the minimum times), strong northwinds, weak north winds and cyclonic winds for conditions similar to the Chazhma Baycriticality accident (fresh fuel) and for a criticality accident for the same type of reactor with fuelbeing withdrawn (spent fuel). The maximum individual committed dosages were less than 2 x10-7 and 2 x 10-3 mSv, respectively. The long-term external doses by radionuclides deposited onthe ground and the internal doses by consumption of foods were not evaluated as it is believedthat such doses can be avoided by social controls. In other calculations taking these longer termdoses into account and determining the sum of the maximum individual committed dosages(SMICD), we found for each of the surrounding countries to be less than 1 mSv. In that part ofRussia the (SMICD) is less than 6 mSv. For releases from the Petropavlovsk sites the (SMICD)for each of the surrounding countries is less than 0.3 mSv. In that part of Russia the (SMICD) isless than 6 mSv.