Cost-based and time-based analysis of DoS-resistance in HIP

摘要

We develop a formal model of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) based on Timed Coloured Petri Nets (Timed CPNs) and use a simulation approach provided in CPN Tools to achieve a formal analysis. We aim to examine unbalanced computation that leads to resource exhaustion attacks in key exchange protocols comparing among a legitimate initiator, four types of adversary who attempt to deny the service at different stages of the protocol execution, and a responder. By adopting the key idea of Meadows' cost-based framework and refining the definition of operational costs during the protocol execution, our simulation provides an accurate cost estimate of protocol execution comparing between those principals. Under four defined attack strategies, however, Meadows' cost-based framework generates a different outcome compared with the simulation approach from Timed CPNs. Analysis of our experimental results reveals a limitation of Meadows' cost-based framework for addressing DoS threats.