THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS FUNCTION – RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, THE NPT AND THE STATUTE

摘要

IAEA safeguards operate at the intersection of a number of relationships – the IAEA and the inspected state, the IAEA and other states, and the inspected state and other states. Discussion of safeguards issues generally occurs in the context of safeguards agreements. While these agreements have two parties – the IAEA and the inspected state – the obligations and responsibilities of the parties are much more than bilateral. For example, in the case of a comprehensive safeguards agreement the inspected state also has obligations towards the other parties to the NPT; and the IAEA has responsibilities under the NPT, as well as responsibilities to IAEA Member States under its Statute. The performance of safeguards agreements, by the inspected state and by the IAEA, cannot be considered in isolation, but needs to be considered also in these other contexts. What does this mean in practice? For a start, the inspected state cannot afford to lose sight of an essential function of safeguards, to provide assurance to other states about its observance of its NPT peaceful use commitment. Lack of full cooperation with the IAEA will, at the least, result in a “confidence deficit,” which will be counterproductive to the inspected state’s own interests. Another aspect is the “preventive” function envisaged for safeguards under the NPT. How should prevention of diversion be factored into safeguards implementation? If safeguards are construed too narrowly and legalistically they will fail in their confidence-building and assurance function – with potential repercussions for all parties. This paper will canvass a broader perspective for safeguards, reflecting the range of expectations which safeguards are required to meet.