首页> 外文会议>INMM annual meeting >PHASED IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA VERIFICATION IN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO PROMOTE NONPROLIFERATION,ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES
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PHASED IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA VERIFICATION IN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO PROMOTE NONPROLIFERATION,ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES

机译:逐步执行核武器国家核查核武器核查,促进促进武器控制和裁军目标

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Progress on nuclear arms control and policies that support disarmament in the long-term are U.S. obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and top priorities of the Obama Administration. The Administration has taken action to negotiate and implement various arms control treaties while expanding its support for international verification of peaceful uses under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards. This paper explores the potential benefits and costs of a long-term phased approach to implementation of existing Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOA) to advance U.S. and other Nuclear Weapon State’s (NWS) nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament goals. Under this new approach to VOA implementation, all new enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) capacity constructed in the United States and partnering NWS would be placed under active IAEA Safeguards pursuant to existing VOAs. Furthermore, all closed down and decommissioned ENR capacity would be subject to Complimentary Access (CA) status inspections under related Additional Protocols (AP). In non-NPT States, comparable arrangements could be pursued through expanded INFCIRC/66 Safeguards implementation on a facility-by-facility basis. Placing all new ENR capacity under IAEA Safeguards is an essential first step down “the road to global zero” since the end point of that road requires universal peaceful use verification. Along that road, an essential step is a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), or a logically equivalent set of multilateral or bilateral agreements. Phased VOA implementation as described above could gradually reduce the practical barrier to verification of an FMCT. By focusing on new ENR capacity and verifying status of closed down and decommissioned ENR facilities, a gradually rising on-ramp is built which supports the desired outcomes and a reasonable transition period for IAEA budgetary and technical preparations. This phased approach enables a sustainable and incremental path to move the United States, other NWS, and non-NPT States into positions that supports verification of an FMCT and the road to global zero.
机译:在长期以来,支持裁军的核武器控制和政策的进展是在不扩散条约(NPT)下的义务和奥巴马管理的首要任务。政府当局已采取行动谈判和实施各种军备控制条约,同时扩大其对国际原子能机构(原子能机构)保障下的和平利用国际核查的支持。本文探讨了长期逐步逐步审议的潜在福利和成本,以实施现有的自愿提供协议(VOA)推进美国和其他核武器国家(NWS)的非透过,军备控制和裁军目标。根据这种新的VOA实施方法,美国建造的所有新的富集和再加工(REN)能力将根据现有的宣传案,将在活跃的IAEA保障下置于活跃的IAEA保障下。此外,所有已关闭和退役的ENC产能将受到相关附加议定书(AP)下的互补(CA)状态检查。在非不注目的国家中,可以通过扩大的Infcirc / 66在设施基础上进行维护实施来追求可比的安排。在原子能机构保障率下放置所有新的恩能力是一项重要的第一步,自该道路的终点以来,这一道路的终点是普遍的和平利用验证。沿着这条路,重要的步骤是可验证的裂变材料截止条约(FMCT),或逻辑上等同的多边或双边协议一套。如上所述的相位的VOA实现可以逐渐降低验证FMCT的实际障碍。通过专注于新的REN能力和验证关闭和退役的恩乐设施的状态,建立了逐渐上升的斜坡上升,这支持了原子能机构预算和技术准备的理想成果和合理的过渡期。这种分阶段方法使可持续和增量的路径能够将美国,其他NW和非NPT状态转移到支持核查FMCT和全球零路的职位的位置。

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