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Nuclear Material Verification From Guidelines to Implementation: Lessons Learned

机译:从实施指南核实核材料核实:学习的经验教训

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摘要

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970, requiring that each Non-nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT conclude a compreshensive safeguards agreement with teh International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has been applying safeguards under such agreements in a growing number of countries. The objective of comprehensiv safegurads pursuant to the NPT is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are negotiated with individual Non-nuclear Weapon State parties to the NPT according to the principles, the assurance of no diversion is based on nuclear material accounting principles with containment and surveillance (C/S) as important complementary measures to facilitate its practical implementation.
机译:1970年,核武器(NPT)不扩散的条约,要求每个非核武器缔约国向不扩散核武器特国家缔约国缔结了与国际原子能机构(原子能机构)的成立保障协议。原子能机构一直在越来越多的国家的此类协议下申请保障措施。根据“不扩散核武器特人”全面捍卫救保的目标是及时检测与和平核活动的大量核材料转移。综合保障协定根据原则与不核武器缔约国与不核武器缔约国谈判,没有转移的保证是基于核材料会计原则,其中包含遏制和监测(C / S),以促进其实用的重要互补措施执行。

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