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A Study on Incentive Mechanism of logistics Outsourcing among Multi-Task Principal-Agent

机译:多任务委托代理之间的物流外包激励机制研究

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Logistics Outsourcing of the Enterprises is to develop third-party specialty logistics.It is a basic content about how to realize logistics industrial organization optimization.Outsourcing leads to incentive problem about external logistics enterprises agencing the enterprises'logistics service which is different from logistics management in enterprise.Third-party specialty logistics enterprises often accept several logistics service demanders'logistics service principal.In this paper we use multi-task principal-agent theory to discuss the process of logistics outsourcing and optimal incentive machanism with multi-task in the case of dependent endeavor cost and independent endeavor cost.
机译:企业的物流外包是发展第三方专业物流。这是实现物流产业组织优化的基本内容。外包导致外部物流企业对企业物流服务的激励问题,这不同于物流管理中的问题。第三方专业物流企业通常会接受多个物流服务需求者的物流服务主体。本文采用多任务委托-代理理论讨论了物流外包的过程以及在多任务情况下的多任务最优激励机制。依存成本和独立成本。

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