首页> 外文会议>International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Scinece 2004(MFCS 2004); 20040822-20040827; Prague; CZ >A Combinatorial Strongly Subexponential Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Mean Payoff Games
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A Combinatorial Strongly Subexponential Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Mean Payoff Games

机译:均值博弈的组合强次指数策略改进算法

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摘要

We suggest the first strongly subexponential and purely combinatorial algorithm for mean payoff games. It is based on solving a new "controlled" version of the shortest paths problem. By selecting exactly one outgoing edge in each of the controlled vertices we want to maximize the shortest distances to the unique sink. Mean payoff games easily reduce to this problem. To compute the longest shortest paths, player MAX selects a strategy (one edge in each controlled vertex) and player MIN responds by evaluating shortest paths to the sink in the remaining graph. Then MAX locally changes choices in controlled vertices, making attractive switches that seem to increase shortest paths (under the current evaluation). We show that this is a monotonic strategy improvement, and every locally optimal strategy is globally optimal. A careful choice of the next iterate results in a randomized algorithm of complexity min(poly(n) • W, 2~(O(n log n)~(1/2)), which is simultaneously pseudopolyno-mial (W is the maximal absolute edge weight) and subexponential in the number of vertices n. All previous algorithms for mean payoff games were either exponential or pseudopolynomial (which is purely exponential for exponentially large edge weights).
机译:我们建议使用第一个强次指数和纯组合算法进行均值支付游戏。它基于解决最短路径问题的新“受控”版本。通过在每个受控顶点中选择恰好一个输出边,我们希望最大程度地缩短到唯一接收点的距离。平均收益游戏很容易解决这个问题。为了计算最长的最短路径,玩家MAX选择一种策略(每个受控顶点中的一条边),而玩家MIN通过评估剩余图中最短路径的最短路径来做出响应。然后,MAX会局部更改受控顶点的选择,从而形成吸引人的开关,这些开关似乎会增加最短路径(根据当前评估)。我们证明这是单调策略的改进,每个局部最优策略都是全局最优的。仔细选择下一个迭代,将得到复杂度为min(poly(n)•W,2〜(O(n log n)〜(1/2))的随机算法,该算法同时是伪多项式(W是最大的绝对边权重)和次要的顶点数n。所有以前的均值收益博弈算法都是指数或伪多项式(对于指数大的边权重,它纯粹是指数)。

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