We introduce language-based games,a generalization of psychological games [Geanakoplos et al.,1989] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [K?oszegi and Rabin,2006],which extend the domain of the utility function to situations,maximal consistent sets in some language.The role of the underlying language in this framework is thus particularly critical.Of special interest are languages that can express only coarse beliefs [Mullainathan,2002].Despite the expressive power of the approach,we show that it can describe games in a simple,natural way.Nash equilibrium and rationalizability are generalized to this setting;Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist in general,while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild conditions.
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机译：我们介绍了基于语言的游戏，一种心理游戏的概括[Geanakoplos et al。，1989]，它也可以捕获参考依赖的偏好[K？oszegi and Rabin，2006]，从而将效用函数的范围扩展到最大因此，基础语言在此框架中的作用尤其重要。特别令人关注的是只能表达粗略信念的语言[Mullainathan，2002]。尽管这种方法具有表达力，但我们证明了它可以纳什均衡和合理性被推广到这种情况；证明纳什均衡一般不存在，而合理化策略的存在被证明是在温和的条件下进行的。
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