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Regression Analysis of Executive Shareholding and Corporate Earnings Management

机译:高管持股与公司盈余管理的回归分析

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The distortion of financial data of Chinese listed companies emerges is constantly emerging, for example earnings management through various means such as whitewashing financial reports, which is bound to have a negative impact on China's economic development. This paper uses regression analysis to examine the relationship between the company's executive shareholding and earnings management level. Under certain conditions, the company's executive shareholding and earnings management level have a negative correlation. The larger the company's executive shareholding, the more effective the governance mechanism, and the higher the efficiency of supervision and incentives, the more it will help the management to operate the company with the goal of maximizing shareholders' interests and reduce earnings management.
机译:中国上市公司财务数据的失真现象正在不断出现,例如通过粉饰财务报告等各种手段进行盈余管理,这势必对中国的经济发展产生负面影响。本文使用回归分析来研究公司高管持股与盈余管理水平之间的关系。在一定条件下,公司的高管持股与盈余管理水平呈负相关。公司高管持股越大,治理机制越有效,监督和激励的效率越高,就越有助于管理层以最大化股东利益和减少盈余管理为目标来经营公司。

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