On the Unprovable Security of 2-Key XCBC

摘要

There has been extensive research focusing on improving CBC-MAC to operate on variable length messages with less keys and less blockcipher invocations. After Black and Rogaway's XCBC, Moriai and Imai proposed 2-Key XCBC, which replaced the third key of XCBC with its first key. Moriai and Imai "proved" that 2-Key XCBC is secure if the underling blockcipher is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). Our research shows that it is not the case. The security of 2-Key XCBC can not be proved under the solo assumption of PRP, even if it is a RPR-RK secure against some related-key attack. We construct a special PRP (PRP-RK) to show that the main lemma in [14] is not true and 2-Key XCBC using this PRP (PRP-RK) is totally insecure.