Criminalization of Aircraft Accidents: How It Affects Safety Initiatives

摘要

If this trend continues toward more criminalization of aviation accidents, the future looks dismal. When air traffic doubles over the next 15 years, coupled with a slow and ineffective accident investigation and prevention program, accidents will simply become more frequent, even at the current accident rate. Hundreds of lives will be senselessly lost over the notion that criminally prosecuting a few dozen people will enhance air safety. Things have to change right now. An analysis of the issues culminates in the following recommendations by this author. One, Congress must make a clear statement of public policy that the greater good is for the investigation of aircraft accidents to find, rectify and communicate the root causes for the prevention of future accidents. The expediency to investigate and prosecute for criminal offenses is secondary. It is the job of the FAA and NTSB to promote aviation safety, not the DOJ. Two, the NTSB must have exclusive jurisdiction over all aircraft accidents above all other state or Federal agencies. Three, a criminal department should be created within the NTSB with the purpose to determine if evidence collected during an accident investigation suggests that law enforcement officials should be notified. Federal criminal investigations would be coordinated with a special aviation division within the DOJ home office in Washington, D.C. Non-federal criminal concerns would be coordinated with the appropriate state or local authority. Also, any DOJ or local law enforcement officials must petition and convince the NTSB criminal division if they wish to intervene. Four, statements and evidence gathered in an accident investigation, and information collected within any safety initiative program (FOQA, ASAP, ASRS), should be privileged by statute and cannot be used in any criminal investigation or prosecution. Criminal investigations can be conducted in parallel once approved by the NTSB criminal division. Witness statements must be gathered by independent means with Miranda rights given. Safety testing is given preference over physical evidence. Five, NTSB or FAA accident investigators should give a quasi-Miranda warning before conducting an interview advising the witness of the special accident investigation privilege, that the privilege is lost if discussions are outside the NTSB/FAA, that outside statements could be used against the witness, and that the witness can have an attorney present for questioning.