Safety performance in many companies and even industries has stalled in the last decade. Accidents rates are at a "plateau" and yet, serious accidents and fatality rates are not. In more dramatic cases, such as in the BP Texas Refinery disaster, organizations that have "exemplary" safety statistics, suddenly have a catastrophic or multi-fatality event occurring. Classic examples are the Piper Alpha disaster and NASA's Challenger and Columbia disasters, the BP's Deepwater Horizon Rig disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Looking into the causes of these accidents provides an insight into the events and deficiencies that led up to the accident, but what are the common features in the organization's mindset, or its culture? What characterizes these organizations' decision-making, their approach to safety and to risk and are there features that can be delineated? The research and review presented in this paper covers a period since 1995, which started in the Australian resource industry and since then covered international events. The features of these organizations are summarized as the seven deadly delusions of near zero organizations (NZO) that suffered unexpected disasters, based on extensive research by the author. More recently, the massive West Fertilizer plant explosion in Texas, and the Train Disaster in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, Canada underlined the same trends. Organizations may experience calamities not because they are bad, or unsafe, but because they have become "cult-like".
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