Two Species Evolutionary Game Model of User and Moderator Dynamics

摘要

We construct a two species evolutionary game model of an online society consisting of ordinary users and behavior enforcers (moderators). Among themselves, moderators play a coordination game choosing between being ``positive'' or ''negative'' (or harsh) while ordinary users play prisoner's dilemma. When interacting, moderators motivate good behavior (cooperation) among the users through punitive actions while the moderators themselves are encouraged or discouraged in their strategic choice by these interactions. We show the following results: (i) We show that the $omega$-limit set of the proposed system is sensitive both to the degree of punishment and the proportion of moderators in closed form. (ii) We demonstrate that the basin of attraction for the Pareto optimal strategy $(text{Cooperate}, text{Positive})$ can be computed exactly. (iii) We demonstrate that for certain initial conditions the system is self-regulating. These results partially explain the stability of many online users communities such as Reddit. We illustrate our results with examples from this online system.