首页> 外文会议>2010 International Conference on Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management >Study on the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise based on the reputation effect
【24h】

Study on the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise based on the reputation effect

机译:基于声誉效应的代理商企业长期奖励激励研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

For the government investment project, there is a long-term cooperation between the government principal and the agent enterprise. The incentive model of reputation effect of the agent enterprise was built to solve the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise under long-term game. The effort degree of the agent enterprise was analyzed with the influence of the reputation effect, and incentive methods of government principal were discussed based on the reputation effect under the cases of symmetry and asymmetric information. The results show that the reputation effect is conducive to encourage the agent enterprise to work harder and the government principal could achieve the long-term incentive effect by adjusting the incentive structure and increasing the reputation incentive.
机译:对于政府投资项目,政府委托人与代理企业之间存在长期合作。建立代理企业声誉效应的激励模型,以解决代理企业长期博弈下的长期奖励激励问题。在声誉效应的影响下,对代理企业的努力程度进行了分析,讨论了在信息对称和信息不对称的情况下,基于声誉效应的政府委托人激励方法。结果表明,声誉效应有利于鼓励代理企业更加努力地工作,而政府委托人可以通过调整激励结构和增加声誉激励来达到长期激励效应。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号