An Agency Theory Examination of Information Systems Project Success

摘要

Agency theory offers a potential explanation for the low success rate of information systems (IS) development projects. The theory suggests that the use of appropriate monitoring plus incentives and rewards increases the likelihood of project success. A survey instrument was developed from previously used scales and content analysis of notes taken during twelve structured interviews. Four hundred thirty project managers completed a Web-based survey. After analysis for reliability and validity, the data were used to test eight agency theory hypotheses related to IS project success. The study contributes to the understanding of IS project management by showing that contract type, monitoring, goal conflict, shirking, and privately-held information are multi-dimensional constructs and by providing an instrument for future research. It validates existing instruments for measuring task programmability and project success. It provides support for agency theory predictions that more outcome-based contracts, more monitoring, less shirking, and less misrepresentation of privately-held information lead to project success. Finally, it contradicts expectations that more goal conflict and more task programmability lead to more outcome-based contracts and that more outcome-based contracts lead to less monitoring.