Using Existing Inventory of Process Hazards to Screen for Possible Terrorist Scenarios

摘要

Do you know where your risks are? Do you have an inventory of hazards at your sites? If you had been asked in late September 2001 which of your sites, anywhere in the world, might be attractive terrorist targets (because they have some potential to cause significant or spectacular damage), would you have had the answer at your fingertips? Over the past several years, we at FMC have developed an inventory of our hazards. When we put it together, we were considering the normal "causes" of process safety accidents, but it turned out to be a good foundation for our security screening, since the potential "consequences" of a catastrophic loss-of-containment incident are similar, regardless of what "causes" that loss of containment. Because the risk profile information for our sites is contained in a database, it is relatively easy to screen out sites and sections of plants that do not meet our criteria as attractive "terrorist targets." This paper describes FMC's criteria, our approach to integrating potential security threats into our risk management program, and discusses lessons that may be applied to future extensions of the program.